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In determining the true nature of the rights of the owner of land
in the oil and gas beneath the surface, the courts have been confronted
with a problem of considerable difficulty. To say that no sound prin-
ciple regulating such rights has been determined upon may be putting
it too strongly, but it can be safely said that as the decisions stand
to-day they are very inconsistent in theory, and not altogether just in
application. To appreciate fully the nature of the problem it seems
necessary to recall some fundamental conceptions as they have devel-
oped in the law of property.
Until comparatively recent times, man in his existence upon the earth
has been primarily concerned with its surface. Upon the surface he
lived, found or produced his food, and fought his enemies. In his
nomadic stages the earth and its fruits were no doubt considered free,
but as the wandering instinct gave way to the desire for a fixed place of
abode, and the individual, family, or tribe, sought by force to control
a particular part of the earth, such control was, no doubt, both by
reason and necessity, limited to a dominion or control of the surface
only. It must have been at a later period, when the practice of mining
and quarrying the solid minerals of the earth had become common,
that the maxim "cuius est solum, eius est usque ad caelam ad inferos,"
was given expression-to, and the surface was presumed to be the meas-
ure and not the extent of man's dominion. This maxim that the
owner of the surface owns everything from the center of the earth
to infinity above may, at the time of its conception, have been perfectly
true, but experience has taught that its qualification was necessary.
It has been qualified by another maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas," so as to give a just and equitable right to the landowner in
respect to lateral support, light, air, -and water on the surface. When
rights as to subterranean substances such as water, oil and gas came
before the courts for determination their problem was to decide what
qualification, if any, should be made of this principle of absolute
ownership.
Since underground waters and oil and gas are alike minerals of
fugitive and wandering nature, and since the question as to water arose
first, it seems not out of place to make brief mention of the develop-
ment of the law relative to that species of property. It is to be noted
that up to this time the law had dealt only with substances of wander-
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ing nature as exist above the surface of the earth, and as to these the
qualification of the absolute ownership doctrine had been such as
practically to deny the idea of ownership.
The landowner's right to underground percolating water is said to
have first arisen in the well known case of Acton v. Blundell.' The
plaintiff there brought an action for alleged interference with water
which was flowing underground to his spring by the operation of a
coal mine on adjoining land. The rules of law governing surface
streams were urged as a solution, but the court refused so to hold
and made the following statement, which has been much cited and
quoted as laying down the correct principle.
2
"We think the present case, for reasons given above, is not to be
governed by the law which applies to rivers and flowing streams, but
that it rather falls within that principle, which gives to the owner of
the soil all that lies beneath his surface; that the land immediately
below his property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or
venous earth, or part soil, part water; that the person who owns the
surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own
purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of
such right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from under-
ground springs in his neighbour's well, this inconvenience to his
neighbour falls within the description of damnum absque injuria,
which cannot become the ground of an action."
3
Although this theory of absolute ownership as governing rights of
landowners in subterranean waters has been retained in England
and many of the states of this country, yet it has met with a dissatis-
faction that has resulted in engrafting upon the main principle several
important exceptions. Perhaps the most important of these quali-
fications are that the owner of land may not intercept and use all of
the water of an underground stream, foul or maliciously divert per-
colating water, or appropriate such water so as to injure a flowing
stream.4 But these qualifications of the absolute ownership theory were
not sufficient to allay the criticism of the rule. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire in a well reasoned case5 attacked it as being
unsound in theory and impractical in application and brought forth
as a substitute the doctrine of correlative rights in percolating waters
based on the maxim, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." This
' (1843, Exch.) 12 M. & W. 324.
'Chasemore v. Richards (1859) 7 H. L. Cas. 349; Grand Junction Canal Co.
v. Shugar (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. App. 483; Wheatley v. Baugh (855) 25 Pa. St.
528; Hanson v. McCue (i87i) 42 Calif. 303; Frazier v. Brown (3863) 12 Oh.
St. 294; New Albany & Salem R. R. v. Peterson (i86o) 14 Ind. 112; City of
Greencastle v. Hazelett (1864) 23 Ind. 186; Ryan v. Quinlan (1912) 45 Mont.
521, 124 Pac. 512; 30 Amn. & Eng. Cyc. (2d ed. i9o5) 3 ioff.
'Acton v. Blundell, supra, 353.
'See cases cited in 30 An. & Eng. Cyc. (2d ed. I9o5) 33Off.
.*Bassett v. Salisbury Co. (I86z) 43 N. H. 569.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
doctrine has been favorably received in many states and the trend
of the later decisions is decidedly in that direction.6
The question of property in oil seems to have first arisen in a Ken-
tucky case decided in I854.' Although Acton v. Blundell had been
decided some eleven years previous no mention was made of that case.
The defendant had taken three barrels of petroleum oil from the well
of the plaintiff and action was brought for its recovery. One of the
questions necessary for the decision was whether the oil, when taken,
was a part of the freehold. Counsel argued that the law applicable
to surface streams of water should govern and cited Blackstone, Kent,
and Bouvier's Institutes as authority. But the court refused so to
hold, saying that as the owner of land had an exclusive property in
water in a spring or well on his land, as distinguished from flowing
water, so should he be considered
"the exclusive owner of oil, a peculiar liquid not necessary nor indeed
suitable for the common use of man, and for reaching and obtaining
which for its proper uses and for profit, he has constructed a well
with suitable fixtures.""
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, realizing the inapplicability of
the absolute ownership doctrine, as applied to solid minerals, to oil
and gas constructed a rule of property in these new minerals which has
become the law in most of the states in this country.9
"Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by them-
selves, if the analogy is not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae.
In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the
aSwett v. Cutts (1870) 50 N. H. 439; Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) 141 Calif.
1i6, 7o Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766, 64 L. R. A. 236, note; Forbell v. City of New York(igoo) 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644, 51 L. R. A. 695, note; Barclay v. Abraham
(1903) 121 Iowa, 61g, 96 N. W. io8o; Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer (9o3)
.89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 9o7, 6o L. R. A. 875, haote; Erickson v. Crookston Water-
works Co. (19o8) 1O5 Minn. 182, 117 N. W. 435, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 65o, note;
Meeker v. East Orange (19og, Ct. Err. & App.) 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 At. 379,
25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, note; Pence v. Carney (1906) 58 W. Va. 296, 52 S. E.
7o2, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 266, note.
7Hail v. Reed (1854) 54 Ky. 383.
8 Ibid., 392.
"Westmoreland Gas Co. v. De Witt (1889) 130 Pa. St. 235, 18 Atd. 724;
.Hague v. Wheeler (1893) 157 Pa. St. 341, 27 Atl. 714; Jones v. Forest Oil Co.
(igo) 194 Pa. St. 379, 44 AtI. 1O74; Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co. (19o7)
216 Pa. St. 362, 65 Atl. 8O1; Poe v. Ulrey (1908) 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46;
People's Gas Co. v. Tyner (1892) 131 Ind. 277, 31 N. E. 59, 16 L. R. A. 443,
-note; Murray v. Allred (1897) ioo Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355; Isonm v. Rex Crude
-Oil Co. (i9o5) 147 Calif. 659, 82 Pac. 317; Hughes v. United Pipe Lines (18go)
iig N. Y. 423, 23 N. E. 1O42; Williamson v. Jones (1894) 39 W. Va. 256, 19
S. E. 436, 25 L. R. A. 2=, note; Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897) 57 Oh. St. 317,
49 N. E. 399; Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell (19o9, C. C. E. D. Okla.) 172
Fed. 545; Brown v. Spilman (895) 155 U. S. 665, 15 Sup. Ct. 245; De Moss v.
.Sample (1918) 143 La. 243, 78 So. 482.
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power and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner.
Their 'fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a par-
ticular tract is uncertain,' as said by Chief Justice Agnew in Brown v.
Vandergrift, 8o Pa. 147, 148. They belong to the owner of the land,
and are a part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to
his control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or come
under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. Posses-
sion of the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas.
If an adjbining, or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and
taps your gas, so that it comes into his well and under his control,
it is no longer yours, but his."' 0
A few years later the question was presented to the same court as
to whether an owner of land having a gas well thereon could be
restrained from allowing the gas to escape thereby draining the
reservoir below so as to deplete the flow of the well of an adjoining
owner. The court, following the logical application of the absolute
ownership doctrine, denied that the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas" in any way affected the landowner's right to take or use
the gas. It said that the owner's dominion is, upon general principles,
as absolute over the fluid as the solid minerals.:"
In another case where the question was of the right of the owner
of an oil well to pump oil from his well regardless of injury to his
neighbor, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently realized that
the absolute ownership doctrine in the sense of giving an absolute
right to take could not be applied so they reverted to the theory that
"possession of the land is not necessarily possession of the oil and gas,"
and concluded "that the property of the owner of the lands in oil and
gas is not absolute until it is actually within his grasp and brought to
the surface."' 2
Thus far in the cases it is to be noted that the courts have concerned
themselves primarily with the owner's right to take the oil and gas
under his land and have held the right absolute upon the principle of
absolute ownership or some qualification of that doctrine, but they
have not given serious consideration to the rights of the adjoining
landowner whose oil or gas is taken by the operations of his neigh-
bor. But in Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Company, which
was an action to prevent the owner-of land from drilling a well so
close to the land of his neighbor as to draw the oil therefrom, the
court said :1"
"Every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells wherever he pleases
regardless of the interest of others. He may distribute them over the
whole farm or locate them only on one part of it. He may crowd the
" Westmoreland Natural Gas Co: v. De Witt, supra, 249.
'Hague v. Wheeler, supra.
"Jontes v. Forest Oil Co., supra, 383.11 Supra, 365.
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adjoining farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and gas from them.
What then can the neighbor do? Nothing, only go and do likewise."
The same rule has been adhered to in Ohio.14
These cases, it is to be observed, adhere strictly to the doctrine of
absolute ownership in defining the rights of the owner of the soil to
take the oil and gas thereunder, and go farther than do those courts
which apply the absolute ownership doctrine to subterranean water. 15
This rule is the law in a great majority of American states,16 although
waste of oil and gas underlying the land has been prevented in some
states by statute and in some by judicial decision."
The opinions of the courts, particularly those of Pennsylvania, have
been thus referred to, for the purpose of shbwing some of the develop-
ments of the law of oil and gas, and making clear if possible the
influences which affected the adoption of the theory of absolute owner-
ship as a basis of the rights of the landowner in these substances.
To construct and apply a correct rule of property governing these new
and peculiar substances was no doubt a puzzling one to the courts.
One proposition seemed clear enough, that is, that oil and gas were
minerals, 8 and as such a part of the land.'9 If minerals and a part of
the land, they must, according to all known principles of law, belong
to the owner of the land by some degree of ownership. The principle
of absolute ownership has been applied to minerals of sofid nature such
as coal and iron and also to subterranean waters, another mineral of
fugitive nature, therefore, it was only natural for the courts to follow
as far as possible these analogies and precedents and make the principle
of absolute ownership the basis of property rights in oil and gas. To
do so, certain qualifications and exceptions were made so as to fit the
principle to the peculiar nature of the subject matter. This struggle
of the courts to make the cuius est solum doctrine applicable to oil
and gas has resulted in producing rules of property which it is believed
are unsound in theory and unjust in application.
The rule of absolute ownership when applied to solid materials of
the earth is qualified by the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas," so that one may not use his own land so as to injure his
neighbor. On this theory it is settled law that the owner of land has
an easement of lateral support in the land of his neighbor. 20  For
"Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., supra.
"See 64 L. R. A. 236, note; 30 Am. & Eng. Cyc. (2d ed. 195o) 320ff.
"Thornton, Oil and Gas (2d ed. 1918) secs. I8ff; also cases cited in note 9,
supra.
" Thornton, op. cit., secs. 30-35; Gillespie v. Fulton Oil Co. (I9O8) 236 Ill. 188,
86 N. E. 219; Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (1903) 117 Ky. 71,
77 S. W. 368; Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. findiana Gas Co. (i9oo) 155 Ind. 451,
57 N. E. g12; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (i8g) 177 U. S. Igo, 2o Sup. Ct. 585.
" Thornton, op cit., sec. 18.
"*Ibid., sec. ig.
sI Tiffany, Modern Law of Real Property (19o3) sec. 301.
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example, if a bank of gravel or sand is located on the land of A and B,
and A in removing gravel from his land digs so close to the land of B
as to cause B's gravel to fall into A's land, B may recover in damages
for the removal of the gravel and still assert his title to the mineral
removed. But suppose, instead of taking gravel, A drills an oil or gas
well on his land with the result that he takes not only the gas from
under his land but also draws the oil and gas from under B's land.
A seems here to have done nothing more than remove the natural
support of B's oil and gas so as to cause it to flow in A's land. But
the courts in this latter instance not only refuse to give B a remedy
for the removal of natural support but go further and declare that
as soon as A gets the oil into his own land it is his and that the entire
act is damnum absque injuria. However inconsistent it may seem,
the courts have given two main reasons for refusing to apply this prin-
ciple of absolute ownership as applied to solid materials to oil and gas.
These reasons are: first, because the owner of land is an absolute owner
and may take all the oil and gas he finds therein so long as he confines
his operations to his own land; and second, because oil and gas are
fugitive and wandering in their nature the same principles cannot be
applied to them as are applied to solid minerals without qualification.
This first reason is in application a peculiar one. B is refused a
remedy against A for the taking of the oil from under B's land because
A is an absolute owner of all the oil and gas under his land and has an
absolute right to take it. But is not B also an absolute owner? If
A's ownership must be protected by the law so as to allow him to
enjoy it, must not B's ownership likewise be protected? A vital inci-
dent of ownership is the protection given by law against interference
by others. The inconsistency seems to be in declaring that the owner
of land is an absolute owner of the oil and gas therein and using
that principle as a basis to declare that he may take all the oil and
gas possible from his land regardless of the effect upon the property
of his neighbor and, on the other hand, refusing to recognize that
same principle in enforcing or protecting the ownership of one whose
oil or gas is taken. To put it shortly, the absolute ownership doctrine
is used to make legal the act of taking and is refused when a remedy
for the taking is asked. Such an application of the doctrine forms an
anomalous exception that destroys the principle itself, forms a rule
violative of the plainest principles of justice and equity, acknowledges
the weakness of the law to enforce defined rights of property, and
makes that relic of barbarism,
"The simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can,"
the basis of the law of property in oil and gas.
In support of this first reason for refusing the owner of land a
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remedy against a neighbor who takes or injures his oil or gas the courts
have two supporting propositions based on the peculiar nature of oil and
gas. The first is that it is difficult to tell with exactness how close
one landowner may drill a well to the land of his neighbor and take
oil or gas therefrom without also taking the oil or gas from that
neighbor's land, and if this could be determined, the quantity taken
could not be proven with sufficient certainty to form the foundation
of an action. In other words the remedy is denied because the extent
of the wrong is difficult of proof. It is not necessary that any law, the
product of either popular or judicial legislation, should prescribe the
exact distance within which an oil or gas well may be drilled to the
land of an adjoining owner. The law lays down no rule saying how
close one may excavate to the land of another, yet if such excavation
is made and the land of an adjoining owner is injured a remedy is
afforded for the wrong done. The taking of oil or gas from under
the land of another, like the removal of lateral support, is a question
of fact. If the courts insist on adhering to the principle of absolute
ownership, to be consistent they must compensate an injury to that
ownership and not deny it merely because it is difficult of proof. In
many actions of damages the extent of the actual damage is difficult
of proof but the right of action is not denied on this account. In
oil and gas cases it is interesting to note if A and B, adjoining owners
of land, both lease to C for the purposes of operating for oil and gas
reserving a royalty in themselves, and C drills for oil on the land of
A so as to exhaust the land of B, the courts recognize that B has been
injured and allow him a remedy in damages. It is true the right of B
in this instance is said to be based upon an implied contract in the
lease that C will honestly develop the lands so as to produce the most
for B, but it is to be observed that the measure of damages must be
determined by the amount of oil taken from B's land. As to proof of
damages in this sort of action the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
"The right of recovery being assumed, plaintiff in error cannot
escape liability because the damages are difficult of exact ascertainment.
The nature of the inquiry here is such that it is practically impossible to
ascertain with mathematical certainty the exact amount of defendant
in error's damages. This, however, affords no answer to a cause of
action resulting from the breach of contract or a duty imposed by
law." 21
The second subsidiary reason urged by the courts as an excuse for
refusing a remedy to one whose oil and gas are taken by the operations
of his neighbor, on first impression, appears controlling. Assuming
that the owner of land is absolute owner of the oil and gas therein with
the consequent right to take, such right could not be exercised at all, if
such owner is to be hampered by injuries to his neighbor's oil and gas,
' Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co. (1914) 263 II. S8, 525, 1O5 N. E. 3o8.
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for these substances are of such nature that any taking from the land
of one is likely to injure his neighbor. If, therefore, one land owner
had the right to restrain his neighbor from drilling, it would be
impossible to develop oil and gas lands. But this argument does not
reconcile the fact that the owner of land is said to be the absolute owner
of oil and gas and yet is given no remedy if it is taken. Such argument
would seem on the other hand to show conclusively that the principle
of absolute ownership is not the correct basis of property rights in oil
and gas for if strictly applied practically every taking of these sub-
stances from the earth would give rise to an action for damages.
The foregoiiig discussion leads up to the second main reason why the
courts have refused to apply the doctrine of absolute ownership as
applied to solid minerals to oil and gas. If they attempted such
application they apparently realized the difficulty pointed out above.
Recognizing the peculiar nature of these substances and their power
to move about beneath the surface of the earth, they no doubt realized
that if they applied the doctrine of absolute ownership to allow one
owner to take all beneath the surface, to be consistent they must also
apply such doctrine to give a remedy to one whose oil and gas was
taken, and that the result of this would be that oil and gas lands
could not be developed. Still clinging to absolute ownership as a
fundamental and controlling doctrine the Pennsylvania court adopted
a qualification to that principle which was supposed to avoid the diffi-
culties of the old rule. Relying upon the analogy between oil and gas
and animals ferae naturae that court laid down the rule to be that oil
and gag belong to the owner of the land so long as they are in it but
when they escape and go into the land of another the former owner
loses all of his rights thereto.
This theory of absolute ownership as qualified by the Pennsylvania
court establishes a rule which allows the oil and gas operator great
latitude in the development of oil lands. Under such a rule he may
take all of the oil and gas from under his own land even though in
so doing he may drain the oil and gas from the land of his neighbors,
and he may take by any means his ingenuity may provide, and use, sell,
or waste the same, and as long as he confines his surface operations to
the boundaries of his own land, whatever injury resulting to his neigh-
bor is damnum absque injuria.2 2 This result is arrived at by the court
saying that the taker has absolute ownership which must be protected
by giving this absolute right to take, and by further declaring that one
whose land is drained loses his ownership and right of property in
oil and gas in situ under the land as soon as it is taken. Sfich rule or
principle is produced by judicial legislation violative of the simplest
principles of the law of property.
There came a time, however, when it began to be realized that the
See cases cited in note 9, supra.
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public had some interest in these great natural resources and that some
measure leading to conservation and prevention of waste should be
enacted. Such statutes were passed in some of the states but were
immediately met with the argument that since the owner of oil and
gas lands was the absolute owner of these substances, at least for the
purpose of development, and that any interference with his right to
the use or production of these minerals was an unconstitutional depri-
vation of property rights. This argument was probably first met
and answered in an Indiana case. 23 Although the court of that state
had in a previous case, 24 depending upon the analogy of subterranean
water, adopted the Pennsylvania rule of absolute ownership, and held
that an owner of a gas well might "shoot" it with nitroglycerin and
thereby increase its flow regardless of the alleged injury to his neigh-
bor's well, yet in this case, which was to try the constitutionality of a
statute to prevent the waste of gas by burning it in flambeau lights,
that court held the statute constitutional and not an interference with
property rights. In arriving at such a conclusion the analogy between
oil and gas and animals ferae naturae was made use of. The court
reasoned that the state could regulate the use and consumption of
these minerals of fugitive and wandering nature as they did that of
animals, but the court did not in any clear sense define its theory of
the landowner's right of property in oil and gas.
In a later Indiana case, State v. Ohio Oil Company,25 that court,
apparently realizing that the conclusion reached in the previous case
could not stand together with the theory of absolute ownership as
adopted in earlier decisions, repudiated the theory of absolute owner-
ship and presented a new one. The court discussed the absolute
ownership doctrine and then its own adoption of the theory that oil and
gas were like oil and animals ferae naturae and concluded:
"We therefore hold that the title to natural gas does not vest in any
private owner until it is reduced to actual possession, and therefore
that the act from which we have quoted is not violative of the con-
stitution, as an unwarranted interference with private property. '26
This theory of property' in oil and gas may be scrutinized from
many viewpoints all of which are interesting. There is no doubt that
it produces a theory upon which the state can regulate the waste of
these natural resources without violation of property rights of the
landowner. From that standpoint it is no doubt an improvement
over the Pennsylvania rule. From the standpoint of the adjoining
owner no different result is reached. Since the owner of the land has
Townsend v. State (186) 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. ig.
" People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, supra.
(1897) 15o Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 8og.
State v. Ohio Oil Co., supra, 32, citing Townsend v. State, supra, and People's
Gas Co. v. Tyner, supra. The same rule has apparently been adopted as to oil.
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no property in the oil or gas in or under his land, none of his property
rights can be violated by the operations of his neighbor. The only
difference as to this point then between the Indiana rule and Pennsyl-
vania rule is one of theory; the former denies any right of property
in one whose oil or gas is taken, while the latter, as pointed out, defines
a property right, but fails to protect it. There is no question but that
in its zeal to protect the interest the Indiana court greatly overworked
the analogy between gas and wild animals. As the Supreme Court
of the United States pointed out in the appeal of this same case, there
is an analogy between gas and wild animals but not an identity.27
Property in wild animals is in the public, with a right in the owner
of the land to reduce to possession in accordance with the regulations
and expressions of the public will, and therefore any regulation of
their use would not be in violation of rights of property. But oil and
gas are not property of the public it must at once be conceded. The
Indiana court says ownership is not in the landowner. This statement
was too strong and had to be qualified later when a life tenant made
the defence to an action for waste by saying that since the remainder-
man had no property in the oil and gas that his own act of mining
these substances was not waste. 28 The court then said that the land-
owner did have a property right in oil and gas in the sense that he
had an exclusive right to take these substances.
The Supreme Court of the United States in upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Indiana statute, without adopting either the Indi-
ana or the Pennsylvania theory of property in oil and gas, pointed
out the dilemma which was involved in any argument against the
statute:
"If the right of the collective owners of the surface to take from the
common fund, and thus reduce a portion of it to possession, does not
create a property interest in the common fund, then the statute does
not provide for the taking of private property without compensation.
If, on the other hand, there be, as a consequence of the right of the
surface owners to reduce to possession, a right of property in them,
in and to the substances contained in the common reservoir of supply,
then as a necessary result of the right of property, its indivisible quality
and the peculiar position of the things to which it relates, there must
arise the legislative power to protect the right of property from
destruction." 29
Shortly after this decision the Indiana court was presented with
the question as to whether an owner of oil and gas lands could prevent
' Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra.
'Richmond National Gas Co. v. Davenport (i9o5) 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N. E.
525; Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co. (i911) 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225. See also Manu-
facturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., supra, where it was admitted that a land-
owner does have a property right in oil and gas in situ under his land.
" Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra, 2o.
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his neighbor from using artificial means to increase the flow of
gas wells to the alleged injury of the plaintiff's wells.30 In this case
the court goes to great length of argument and explanation to evade its
former decisions. The absolute ownership doctrine as applied to
percolating water in earlier cases is repudiated, and the ferae naturae
analogy from which the theory was produced that there was no
property in oil and gas in the landowner is likewise receded from.
The court apparently adopted the theory suggested by the United
States Supreme Court that the owners of oil and gas lands are common
owners of the oil and gas beneath, that every owner should exercise
his right to take in such manner as not to destroy the common source
and that to prevent such destruction, independently of statute, the
common owners of the gas in the common reservoir, have the right to
enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will materially injure,
or which will involve the destruction of, the property in the common
fund, or supply of gas.
This theory is adopted by a line of Kentucky cases.8 1  In Louisville
Gas Company v. Kentucky Heating Company, which was an action
by one owner of gas wells to prevent waste, by another, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals made this statement:
"Every owner may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make a
reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy the
reservoir common to him and his neighbor. This principle has been
often applied. Thus each riparian owner may make a reasonable use
of a lake or stream of water flowing through his land, .but he can not
make an unreasonable use of it. Every traveler may make a reasonable
use of a highway, but not an unreasonable use to the detriment of
another. No one may make an unreasonable use of the atmosphere.
In'all these instances the party aggrieved by the unreasonable use may
maintain an action for redress. In the case before us the plaintiff
and the defendant have each the right to take gas from the common
source of supply, but neither may by waste, destroy the rights of the
other; and, as in the case of other like wrongs, the action for redress
may be brought in the name of the real party in interest.
3 2
In a later case the same court said :3
"The right of the surface owners to take gas from subjacent fields
or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no property in the gas
until it is taken. Before it is taken it is fugitive in its nature, and
belongs in common to the owners of the surface. The right of the
owners to take it is without stint; the only limitation being that it
must be taken for a lawful purpose and in a reasonable manner. Each
"Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., supra.
'Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (29o3) supra; Comnnonwealth
v. Trent (39o3) 117 Ky. 34, 77 S. W. 390; Hamby v. City of Dawson Springs
(19o7) 126 Ky. 451, 1o4 S. W. 259, 12 L. R. A,- (N. S.) 1164, note; Louisville
Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (igog) 132 Ky. 435, III S. W. 374.
Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (i9o3) supra, 78.
'Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (igog) supra.
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tenant in common is restricted to a reasonable use of this right, and
each is entitled to the natural flow of the gas from the subjacent fields,
and any unlawful exercise of this right, by any tenant in common,
which results in injury to the natural right of any other tenant or
surface owner, is an actionable wrong."
From these last mentioned cases it is clear that the courts of Indiana
and Kentucky have advanced a theory, not new in its application to
other substances but new in its application to oil and gas. The Indiana
court has receded from that extreme viewpoint assumed in Ohio Oil
Company v. State, that the landowner has no property whatever in
oil and gas under his land, and the Kentucky court has repudiated their
former view that the owner of the land is the absolute owner of these
substances which underlie his land, and they have met on the common
theory, each relying upon the analogy of oil and gas to air and water
above the surface and the modern doctrine of percolating waters, that
the owner of the land does have a property in the oil and gas under-
lying in that he has an exclusive right to take, but that such property
right is qualified by the principle that the right must be so exercised as
not to injure other landowners who also have a right to take from the
common reservoir. Whether or not a given act of one landowner or
his lessee is violative of the rights of his neighbor is wholly dependent
upon whether such act or omission is a reasonable use of that right.
The objection to the doctrine of absolute ownership, and the qualifi-
cations of that theory have already been pointed out. The unsound-
ness of the Indiana theory that the landowner has no property
whatever in the oil and gas under his land has likewise been made clear.
It now remains to determine if possible, if this middle view of qualified
owner is sound in theory and just and possible of application.
It seems needless to contend longer that oil and gas are not minerals
and when in situ in or under the land a part thereof and that the owner
of the surface has a right to use for himself or transfer property in
these substances to others as separate from the land. Nor is it possible
to evade the possibility that from the peculiar nature of these fugitive
and wandering substances, that every taking of oil and gas by one
landowner from his own land in the exercise of this right may affect
the oil under the land of his neighbors. But should the owner of oil
and gas lands be wholly deprived of this right to take because another
may be injured, or should the right of the taker as the Pennsylvania
rule provides be absolute and the rights of others be subsdrvient to
him? But this doctrine of qualified ownership avoids all of these
inconsistencies and provides that each owner has a right to take and
that any taking is permissible which does not unreasonably injure his
neighbor. The sole ground of the qualification of the landowner's
right to oil and gas is the similar rights of others and the extent of the
qualification is determined by the reasonable use of the right. Since
the right of each landowner is similar, and his enjoyment thereof de-
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pendent upon the action of the neighboring landowners, these rights
must be valueless unless exercised with reference to each other. The
maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas," therefore applies, and as
in the case of water, restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own
right, a reasonable use of his own property, in view of the similar
rights of others.
When the doctrine of reasonable use based on the correlative rights
of the adjoining owners of the surface has been suggested as being
the correct theory of the law of property in oil and gas, the objection
has been raised that there is such difference in the nature of under-
ground water on the one hand and oil and gas on the other that the
same theory cannot be applied to both. This objection, it is believed,
has been made without a clear understanding of the problem involved
and is without foundation in reason. It is true the courts have gen-
erally declared that water is necessary for the use, enjoyment and
improvement of lands, particularly where they are used for agricultural
purposes, and that without it, life could not be sustained. That if the
landowner is deprived of its use his land is destroyed, and this has
been urged as a strong reason for the doctrine of reasonable user of
percolating water. It has been repeatedly declared that any use of
water for the purpose of the enjoyment or improvement of the land
is reasonable, but that wasting or carrying away the water for com-
mercial purposes is unreasonable if it injures the adjoining owner.
And it must also be immediately recognized and admitted that oil and
gas are not necessary for agricultural purposes or necessary for the
common use of man, and that the sole purpose of its production is for
sale and manufacture which necessitates its removal from the vicinity
of the land. But these things are not controlling. Both of these
substances are things of value. To deprive a man of water under
his land deprives him of an indirect profit to be realized out of the
soil, but to remove the oil and gas from another's land, may in many
instances deprive him of the entire value of the land. Because the
tests of reasonableness of use of these different classes of property
are not the same, is not a sound reason that the same theory of property
should not govern both. *The fundamental reason after all why
the doctrine of correlative rights is the proper rule of property govern-
ing them is because of their fugitive and wandering nature beneath
the surface of the earth in liquid or gaseous form so that any taking
by one may have some effects on the presence of these things under
the land of another.
The Indiana and Kentucky courts have not gone very far in the
application of this doctrine of correlative rights in oil and gas. In
fact none of the decided cases have been concerned with oil, but the
foundation is laid and there only remains the application. But will
this theory prove more just and more sound in determining the rights
of adjoining owners than the Pennsylvania doctrine? In the first
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place it does not deceive the landowner by telling him that he has an
absolute right of ownership in the oil and gas under his land and
then refuse him any remedy when another takes it. It informs him
that he has a property in the oil and gas under his land and that he
has a right to take it and use it, but that in exercising this right he
must so act as not to unreasonably injure his neighbor. Such a rule
has already provided a remedy against waste or a malicious sapping of
the earth of the gas therein contained.8' It has likewise declared that
the use of powerful pumps drawing the gas from under the land of
the adjoining owner is an injury which may be enjoined. 5 What then
is to prevent this rule from being applied to prevent one owner from
placing wells near his boundary so as to sap the lands of his neighbor
of the oil and gas therein contained? It merely remains for the court
to determine in each individual case whether this exercise of the right
to take is reasonable. The 'question of reasonableness is a mixed
question of law and fact. .There seems to be no reason why the
remedy should not be either in equity by injunction or in damages at
law.
"Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (I9o3) supra.
"Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., supra.
